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I. INTRODUCTION
In his groundbreaking article The Case for Reparations, author
Ta-Nehisi Coates points out that while the ranks of those advocating
for reparations have evolved over the years, the response from
opponents (and indeed, the country at large) has remained “virtually
the same.”1 Before even reaching the debate over what a reparations
scheme might look like or what it might entail, opponents of
reparations have consistently responded with a familiar refrain: why
didn’t those seeking reparations come forward sooner? Beyond public
debate, modern courts have regularly shut down reparations suits by
invoking statutes of limitations, and occasionally doctrines like laches.
Whether the plaintiffs’ theories of recovery relied upon the
Freedman’s Bureau “40 acres and a mule” guarantee,2 analogies to
Native Americans’ reparations claims,3 the Civil Liberties Act that
compensated Japanese American internment victims,4 or simply years
of enslavement resulting in unjust enrichment,5 in every instance
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modern American courts have rejected these claims based on (among
other rationales) a lack of timeliness. Even when victims and
descendants of victims of the 1921 Tulsa Race Massacre argued that
equitable tolling principles should apply in light of the “conspiracy of
silence,” that prevented earlier legal efforts at redress, the Tenth
Circuit—taking “no great comfort”—concluded otherwise.6
In essence, modern opponents of reparations and even, to a
certain extent, judges ruling against modern day reparations suits, have
bemoaned the failure of African Americans to take legal action in the
years following emancipation, enfranchisement, and the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment. These arguments, however, ignore more than
the harsh realities of racial violence and Jim Crow laws—they ignore
historical fact. In reality, during the decades after the Civil War, a
robust grass roots movement seeking pensions for former slaves (a
form of reparation) gained such momentum that it spawned a lawsuit
that went all the way to the United States Supreme Court, Johnson v.
McAdoo.7 In that case, one of the preeminent Black litigators in the
country eschewed oratory about the horrors of slavery and instead
made a compelling legal argument based on the over $68 million in
cotton taxes (worth over $1.7 billion in today’s dollars) collected by
the U.S. Treasury between 1862 and 1868.8
This article will discuss Johnson v. McAdoo, the first large
scale reparations lawsuit. As this article shows, even its status as the
first such lawsuit brought on behalf of formerly enslaved persons who
were merely “seeking the fruit of their labor” did not prevent those
opposing it from sounding the now-familiar litany of defenses like
limitations, laches, and governmental immunity. In addition, the
lawsuit’s proponents, activist Callie House and lawyer Cornelius J.
Jones, endured a campaign of harassment and trumped-up criminal
prosecutions by the U.S. government. As Johnson v. McAdoo
illustrates, victory at the legislative level and in the courts will not
suffice for reparations opponents. Discrediting those calling for
reparations through personal attacks and criminal prosecution worked
over a century ago, with both House and Jones convicted of mail fraud
in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision. As Johnson v. McAdoo
instructed as far back as 1917, the struggle for reparations will always
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be more than a battle waged in legislative chambers and in courtrooms,
but one fought for the hearts and minds of the public as well.
II. SETTING THE STAGE
While Johnson v. McAdoo represented the first major
reparations case on the federal level, it was not the first reparations
lawsuit. On February 14, 1783, an elderly woman named Belinda
submitted a petition to the Massachusetts legislature seeking an annual
pension for herself and her daughter Prine, an invalid.9 The pension
was sought from the estate of Belinda and Prine’s former owner, Isaac
Royall—one of the leading slaveowners in Massachusetts before
fleeing to England in 1775. Royall’s estate had been confiscated
because of his loyalist ties, and two dozen of his former slaves were
freed. The penniless and elderly Belinda needed more than
manumission after decades enslaved, she demanded compensation.
The petition movingly traces Belinda’s life from capture by slavers at
age 12, through the horrors of the Middle Passage, and through her
decades of abuse as one of Royall’s slaves. Reasoning that his wealth
had been “augmented by her servitude,” her petition sought an
allowance from Royall’s estate.10 Belinda’s impassioned petition was
successful, and she was granted an annual pension.11
There were other individual suits as well, particularly after the
Civil War. In 1878, Henrietta Wood received a $2,500 verdict in
Cincinnati, Ohio after suing her former enslaver, Zebulon Ward.12
Born into slavery in Kentucky approximately sixty years before, Wood
had been emancipated in 1848 only to be kidnapped five years later by
Ward, who sold her. Wood wound up enslaved on a Texas plantation
until after the Civil War. Wood returned to Cincinnati in 1869 and sued
Ward in 1870. While her eight-year sojourn through the legal system
netted her only a fraction of what she had sought, Wood’s victory
“remains the largest known sum ever granted by a U.S. court in
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restitution for slavery.”13 It had deep personal meaning for Wood as
well; her son Arthur Simms, who had been in court with his mother,
used part of the monies awarded to attend what would eventually
become Northwestern University School of Law. In 1889, he became
one of its first African American graduates.14
Yet, while a few sporadic individual legal efforts took place,
the harsh realities of life for ex-slaves mandated the need for action on
a grander scale. By 1899, roughly 21 percent of the Black population
nationally had been born into slavery.15 Left without financial
resources, property, or education, and without any compensation,
many former slaves were relegated to sharecropping or tenant farming,
an arrangement aimed at keeping them economically subservient and
tied to land owned by former slaveholders. As Carter G. Woodson
would describe it in the 1930s, “The poverty which afflicted them for
a generation after Emancipation held them down to the lowest order of
society, nominally free but economically enslaved.”16
As the 19th century drew to a close, the idea of pursuing
pensions for ex-slaves began to gain momentum. Aging veterans of the
Civil War were being compensated for their years of service; why
shouldn’t former slaves be paid for years of forced unpaid labor? The
first ex-slave pension bill (H.R. 11119) was introduced by Rep.
William Connell of Nebraska in 1890.17 Ex-slave pension
organizations began to appear, including: the National Ex-Slave
Pension Club Association of the United States; the Ex-Slave
Petitioners’ Assembly; the Great National Ex-Slave Union; the ExSlave Pension Association; the Ex-Slave Department Industrial
Association of America; and various others.18 The most influential of
these was the National Ex-Slave Mutual Relief, Bounty and Pension
13
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Association of the United States of America (MRB&PA).19 Chartered
on August 7, 1897, the MRB&PA sought to lobby Congress for the
passage of ex-slave pension legislation as well as to serve as a mutual
aid society helping the sick and disabled with medical expenses and
paying for burial expenses.20
Headquartered in Nashville, Tennessee, the association grew
both in membership (at its peak, the group claimed membership of
more than 300,000) and in organization.21 It established a charter,
adopted a constitution and bylaws, held annual conventions, and had a
network of local chapters throughout the South and Midwest. The
organization advocated for a sliding scale of benefits payments: exslaves aged 70 and above would receive an initial payment of $500 and
$15 monthly payments for life; those aged 60–69 years would receive
$300 and $12 monthly payments; ex-slaves who were 50–59 years of
age would receive $100 and $8 monthly payments; and those under 50
would receive a $4 per month pension.22
The association’s two most notable leaders were its general
manager and national promoter, a minister named Isaiah Dickerson,
and its assistant secretary (and later national promoter) Callie House.
House, a widow and mother of five, was an ex-slave who worked as a
laundress.23 As the MRB&PA grew, both House and Dickerson would
be targeted by multiple U.S. government agencies, including the
Bureau of Pensions, the Post Office, and the Department of Justice.
The commissioner of pensions, for example, blamed activists like
House and Dickerson for arousing false hopes in the Black community
for “reparations for historical wrongs to be followed by inevitable
disappointment, and probably distrust of the dominant race and of the
Government.”24 Acting under the unfounded suspicion that the
association’s officers were misrepresenting themselves as government
officials, and raising money under false pretense through their circulars
and mailings, the three government agencies sought to build a fraud
case against the MRB&PA’s leaders. Using sweeping antifraud
19
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powers, the Post Office issued a fraud order against the association on
September 20, 1899; naming House, Dickerson, and other officers, the
order enabled the Post Office to intercept the MRB&PA’s mail and
return it to senders marked “Fraudulent.”25
For approximately twenty years, as the pension bills that were
submitted to Congress languished, the government conducted its
campaign against House, Dickerson, and their organization, clearly
perceiving them as threats. Pension Bureau Inspector W.L. Reid, for
instance, felt that the ex-slave pension movement was “setting the
Negroes wild,” and opined that “If this continues, the government will
have some very serious questions to settle in connection with the
control of the race.”26 The Nashville postmaster, A. Wills, complained
to Acting Assistant Attorney General Harrison Barrett that House was
“defiant in her actions, and seems to think that the negroes have the
right to do what they please in this country.”27
While not all of those who advocated for the cause of
reparations for former slaves had noble intentions, it seems clear that
when it came to House and her association, the campaign mounted
against them was, as historian Mary Frances Berry has observed, “the
selective use of government power.”28 Moreover, the targeting of
House and her colleagues was committed while ignoring similar
efforts by white pension proponents and while declining to prosecute
local pension swindlers. In 1901, Dickerson was found guilty of
“swindling” by a local court in Atlanta, Georgia. Although the
conviction was overturned later that year by the Georgia Supreme
Court, the Bureau of Pensions launched a new investigation of
Dickerson in 1902.29 The hounding continued until Dickerson died in
1909.30
House continued to travel the country and was essentially the
public face of the movement—a role she had been playing even before
Dickerson’s death. Viewed through a modern lens, it seems clear that
the government’s vendetta was not rooted in the fear that the ex-slave
pension movement would actually succeed in enacting a pension law.
Instead, it was based on a fear of black organizing itself, and what it
25
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could lead to. At its peak, the association swelled to nearly 300,000
dues-paying members, and it claimed that more than 600,000 former
slaves had signed its petitions supporting pension bills.31 Even though
the bills failed to garner legislative support, the Post Office, Pension
Bureau, and Department of Justice never relented in their efforts,
choking off the Association’s ability to fundraise by intercepting its
mail and by ordering local post offices to deny payment on money
orders made payable to the Association or its officers. Despite a First
Amendment right to organize and to petition the government, House
and her colleagues were subjected to surveillance, harassment,
investigation for fraud, and of course prosecution.
House herself was arrested in 1916. In an indictment that
identified no victims of her supposed mail fraud, House was accused
of sending misleading circulars through the mail, guaranteeing
pensions to members of the Association, and profiting from the
movement.32 Despite evidence that could most charitably be described
as groundless, House was convicted of mail fraud after a three-day trial
in September 1917 before an all-white, all-male jury.33 The judge,
Edward T. Sanford (who would later serve as a justice on the U.S.
Supreme Court), sentenced Callie House to a year in the Missouri State
Prison in Jefferson City, Missouri. House’s last month was commuted,
and she was released in August 1918.34
The MRB&PA and its leaders were harassed and prosecuted
despite their movement’s lack of legislative success. Imagine if the
NAACP and its leadership had been subjected to similar treatment,
despite the repeated failures of the anti-lynching bills for which it
advocated? But if the halls of Congress would not provide the
battleground Callie House and her Association sought, the courthouse
just might.
III. ENTER CORNELIUS JONES
To litigate a national suit for reparations, House and the
Association needed a nationally prominent lawyer experienced in
taking causes important to the Black community to the highest level.
That made for a short list, at the top of which was Cornelius J. Jones,
31
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one of the few Black lawyers not only admitted to practice before the
United States Supreme Court, but who had also actually argued before
the Court. On April 13, 1896, the same day that the Supreme Court
heard argument in Plessy v. Ferguson, now infamous for its approval
of the “separate but equal” doctrine—the Supreme Court also decided
two companion cases: Gibson v. Mississippi and Smith v. Mississippi.35
Both cases involved Black defendants, both involved claims arising
out of the disfranchisement of Black voters occurring under the
notorious Mississippi Constitution of 1890, and both were argued by
Black attorneys (only the second and third cases ever to be argued by
Black lawyers before the Court). Cornelius J. Jones was primarily
responsible for both cases, and argued the Gibson case (he enlisted
local Washington, D.C. attorney Emanuel Molyneaux Hewlett to argue
the Smith case). Gibson resulted in a decision that excluding Blacks
from grand juries violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Not only did
Gibson result in Justice Harlan’s famous pronouncement that “the
Constitution of the United States, in its present form, forbids so far as
civil and political rights are concerned, discrimination . . . against any
citizen because of his race,” Harlan’s opinion specifically referred to
Jones and Hewlett when he noted that the points made had been “so
forcibly presented by [Gibson’s] counsel, who are of the same race.”36
This may be the only Supreme Court opinion ever referring to the color
of the attorneys arguing the case.
Cornelius J. Jones was an extraordinary individual, and,
surprisingly, has been largely overlooked by much of the scholarship
discussing the legal history of the reparations movement.37 Born into
slavery in Vicksburg, Mississippi on August 13, 1858, Jones obtained
an education at Freedman’s Bureau schools established after the Civil
War.38 In 1878, he graduated from the recently-founded Alcorn State
University in Claiborne County, Mississippi.39 After a stint working as
35
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a cottonseed purchasing agent, Jones became a teacher and by 1885
was serving as the principal at a school in Mayersville, Mississippi.40
He soon set his sights on a legal career, and began “reading the law”
as was the custom during a time in which attendance at a law school
was still something of a rarity for both white and Black lawyers. On
January 28, 1888, Jones was admitted to the bar after an examination
by a panel of three white lawyers in which he displayed “a fine
knowledge of the law.”41
Jones was also active politically, and in 1888 was elected to the
Mississippi legislature (one of only six Blacks out of the 160
members).42 He spoke out boldly against the disfranchising effects of
the state’s 1890 Constitution, and paid the price: that term would be
his only one. Before 1890, Blacks constituted a majority of registered
voters in Mississippi; by 1892, there were 68,127 white registered
voters compared to only 8,615 Black registered voters.43 Although
Jones ran for a congressional seat in 1896 in a largely Black district,
he lost a disputed election and he lost again in contesting the election
results before Congress.44 He ran and lost again in 1898, again
contested the result, and this time his election challenge died in
committee.45 Jones never ran again.
Political disappointment aside, Cornelius Jones built a
reputation as one of the few “go to” Black Supreme Court advocates
by the early 20th century. Besides Gibson and Smith, he also argued
Williams v. Mississippi, in 1898 attacking the exclusion of Black jurors
and the disfranchising effect of Mississippi’s poll tax.46 In 1900, Jones
sought leave to file Bell v. Mississippi as an original suit in the
Supreme Court against the state of Mississippi over the cruel and
unusual punishment of the state’s convict labor system. The Supreme
Court, however, denied such leave.47 Although Jones would not return
to the Court until the Johnson v. McAdoo case, he remained a
40
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nationally prominent figure in the Black community, dividing his time
between his adopted home state of Oklahoma and Washington, D.C.
In taking on the reparations representation, Jones realized that
the failure of legislative efforts to have Congress appropriate funds for
ex-slave pensions called for a change in strategy. He determined that
there was a greater likelihood of success in going after funds that the
government already held, and he found that in the cotton tax. Jones
researched an obscure tax on cotton enacted by Congress as part of the
broader wartime tax on commodities in 1862.48 Congress had amended
the 2 ½ cents per pound tax in 1864 and 1866 (increasing it to 3 cents
per pound), before repealing it altogether in 1868. The 1866 Act,
unlike its predecessor legislation that earmarked the funds for payment
of war debts, designated no specific purpose for the money. Although
the cotton tax could not be collected during the Civil War, it had
produced more than $68 million in revenue for the federal government
between 1866 and 1868, a part of which was apparently for cotton
produced during the war.49
Southern senators had periodically introduced bills seeking to
return these funds to former slaveholders, but none were successful.
The tax had been challenged in federal court in Tennessee in 1867. In
this case, Farrington v. Saunders, the court apparently held for the
challenger in an unpublished order. In 1871, that ruling was affirmed
by the Supreme Court in another unpublished order.50 In a considerably
better known case 24 years later, Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust, the
Supreme Court struck down the original federal income tax as
violating the constitutional prohibition on non-proportional direct
taxes.51 Both the result in Pollock and its reasoning strengthened the
argument that the cotton tax had been unconstitutional.52
So the money—the equivalent of more than $1.7 billion
today—was still sitting untouched in the United States Treasury. Jones
was careful to verify this before filing suit. In May 1915, he wrote to
Secretary of the Treasury William G. McAdoo, inquiring about the
cotton tax revenue. Jones received a reply from Assistant Secretary

48
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William S. Malburn.53 Malburn confirmed that more than $68 million
was in the Treasury’s possession as proceeds from the tax, and also
mentioned the Farrington v. Saunders case, incorrectly stating that the
constitutionality of the tax had been upheld.54 He also maintained that
“though bills for a refund of the cotton tax have been introduced in
Congress from time to time, no legislation has been enacted; and the
subject is one within the jurisdiction of Congress.”55
IV. JOHNSON V. MCADOO IN THE COURTS
Having verified that there was indeed money being held by the
Treasury, on July 13, 1915, Jones proceeded with filing a complaint on
behalf of four named plaintiffs, all of whom had been enslaved: H.N.
Johnson, C.B. Williams, Rebecca Bowers, and Minnie Thompson, as
well as on behalf of “a multiplicity of persons similarly situated.”56 The
defendant was William McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury. The case
was filed in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, which then
functioned as the local trial court. Jones’ co-counsel on the case was
his old colleague from the Gibson and Smith cases twenty years earlier,
Emanuel Hewlett, who was well-connected in Washington circles and
who had been a long-serving justice of the peace in Washington, D.C.
(making him one of only a handful of African Americans to have
served as judicial officers). Hewlett’s involvement was short-lived,
however; he soon withdrew from the case, which was ultimately
litigated based on an October 26, 1915 amended complaint bearing
only Jones’ signature.57
The complaint itself reflected an equitable lien theory of
recovery, a conscious choice by Jones. He deliberately avoided
asserting a broad claim to reparations, or for all Black Americans.
Jones also avoided specific references to Reconstruction and any
alleged promises made by the Freedman’s Bureau, just as he avoided
references to the horrors of slavery or the degradation of Jim Crow.
Jones also deliberately refrained from references to the rights of Blacks
53
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under the Constitution, understanding that by 1915, the civil rights
victories won during Reconstruction, including the Fourteenth
Amendment, were now being used to defend corporations.58
Jones also anticipated that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity—the principle that the government cannot be sued without
its consent—would likely be invoked as a defense, and so he did not
sue the U.S. government. Although McAdoo was the putative
defendant, Jones also understood that a suit seeking to direct an official
to take a certain action was tantamount to a suit against the
government. Accordingly, the equitable lien theory Jones advanced
was that although the Treasury was holding the tax revenue, it was in
fact a lien on cotton that the plaintiffs had been compelled to produce
as slaves, and so the ex-slaves always had the right to the funds—the
“fruits of their labors.” Even though this was a right that could not be
exercised during their enslavement, Jones argued, it did not diminish
the right itself. The suit maintained that the $68,072,388.99 was not
only “not a legitimate asset of the United States government,” it was
“but a small fraction of the total valuation of the cotton produced by
these plaintiffs.”59 Since it was “all which is available of the specific
fruit from the specific subject of the toil of these plaintiffs,” however,
it would have to do.60 And because the labor that led to this fruit was
the result not of a negotiated contract but of “force and coercion,” the
court had equitable authority to disburse it.61
Under this equitable lien theory, Jones argued, the money was
in the Treasury secretary’s possession only for custodial purposes,
much like the Treasury held Native American monies (payable under
specific treaties) in trust. And if the cotton tax itself had been
unconstitutional, Jones said, then the funds had been illegally collected
by the government and properly belonged to the former slaves.62

58
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Reaction to the suit was predictable. The mainstream white
media pointed to expectations that governmental immunity would
result in the case being thrown out.63 Among the Black press, even
those that had traditionally been critical of Callie House and the exslave pension movement still commented favorably on the suit. One of
the most influential Black newspapers, the Chicago Defender,
displayed a markedly evenhanded approach, reporting on Secretary
McAdoo’s denunciation of the suit in one issue under the headline
“Cotton Tax Suit Has No Merit” and then running Jones’ reply in the
next issue (“Cotton Tax Suit Has Merit”).64 And despite the Malburn
letter prior to suit, Secretary McAdoo actually wrote to Jones and
denied that there was a “fund of $68,000,000 or any sum in the
Treasury of the United States for ex-slaves, or those who worked in
the cotton fields of the South.”65
Anticipating a long and costly legal battle, Jones circulated
information about the suit to potential claimants and asked for support.
While Callie House and the Association sought support from local
chapters and the general public, Jones issued a letter asking Blacks to
contribute $1.75 each, explaining that ex-slaves would share in the
proceeds of the suit if successful.66 It would prove fateful, as federal
officials convinced that the reparations movement was a fraudulent
scam would later use Jones’ efforts as a basis for criminal charges.
As Secretary McAdoo predicted, the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia dismissed the suit on December 10, 1915. Jones
appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, reiterating his equitable
lien theory. His brief abandoned the sterile argument of his complaint
at the trial court, however, and included oratorical flourishes such as
quoting the Declaration of Independence and Abraham Lincoln. In less
flowery passages, Jones tried to focus on the unconstitutionality of the
1862 Cotton Tax Act, and that the monies collected under this “void
law” represented the fruit of “unpaid-for labor” subject to an equitable
lien in the plaintiffs’ favor.67 Not surprisingly, McAdoo as appellee
focused on the sovereign immunity defense, proclaiming “suit is
against the United States.” The D.C. Circuit agreed, affirming in a brief
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opinion.68 While the court acknowledged McAdoo’s status as “merely
[the] custodian” of the $68 million at issue, the “real defendant . . . is
the United States.”69 Noting that the case had “other apparent
weaknesses,” the court nevertheless grounded its decision to affirm on
“the fact that the United States cannot be made a party to this suit
without its consent.”70
Jones appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The government’s
appellate brief merely quoted the Court of Appeals’ opinion and didn’t
deign to offer additional argument. Jones’ brief argued that while
McAdoo possessed the $68 million, “he has no legitimate claim nor
personal interest in the money, but is a mere custodian thereof in the
nature of bailee.”71 The brief continued with the argument that “if it is
shown that the constitution of the United States has been violated in
the enforcement of a void law, resulting in the accumulation of this
fund, then the money is illegitimately acquired.”72 Concluding that
“the government can not acquire any interest in property illegally
acquired,” Jones argued that “as bailee, the secretary holds legal (but
not official) custody thereof, subject to judicial determination
regarding its status.”73
The U.S. Supreme Court summarily affirmed, without opinion,
on May 7, 1917.74 But although the reparations lawsuit was finished,
Cornelius Jones’ troubles were far from over. As the suit had been
working its way through the courts, Jones’ efforts to drum up support
had placed him in the crosshairs of the federal government. On
November 20, 1915, the day after the trial court in Washington
dismissed the complaint in Johnson v. McAdoo, Jones was arrested in
Memphis on a federal charge of mail fraud stemming from his
fundraising efforts from potential cotton tax claimants.75 The case was
paper-thin, however; fraud requires proof of a false statement or
representation, and there was no evidence that Jones had lied to or
misled anyone. Jones promised nothing more than the chance to share
in any recovery if the suit was successful. Moreover, with the case still
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ongoing, it would be hard to make a case for fraud, especially since a
favorable outcome would eviscerate any grounds for fraud.
On May 26, 1916, six months after his initial arrest, Jones was
indicted by a grand jury.76 On September 28, 1916, Jones was arrested
for a second time in Memphis.77 On January 16, 1917, shortly after the
D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Johnson v. McAdoo but while
the appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court was pending, Jones’ criminal
trial began in Memphis.78 But In mid-trial, the federal prosecutors
suddenly dropped the case. Although no reason was formally given,
one Memphis newspaper speculated that the dismissal was due to the
presiding judge’s discomfort with having the case move forward
before a final ruling from the U.S. Supreme Court.79
After the Supreme Court decided Johnson v. McAdoo on May
17, 1917 and following Callie House’s mail fraud conviction four
months later, the government renewed its vendetta against Jones. On
December 10, 1917, Jones was again indicted for mail fraud.80 His trial
didn’t start until nearly a year later, on December 2, 1918. Despite a
guilty finding by the jury, the judge set aside the verdict on the grounds
of insufficient evidence. Jones was a free man.81
V. AFTERMATH AND CONCLUSION
Although the first major reparations case had been lost,
Cornelius Jones’ fight for reparations did not end at the Supreme
Court. He continued to advocate for a legislative framework for
reparations, addressing a fourth annual convention of cotton tax
claimants in Muskogee, Oklahoma on August 30–31, 1919.82 That
same year, Jones files a memorial with Congress on behalf of cotton
tax claimants, seeking “authority to try their claims in [the] Court of
Claims.”83 In 1920, he traveled to Washington, D.C. three times to
support a pending bill that would permit suit by the cotton tax
claimants. Jones even purchased a building to house the cotton tax
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claimants’ organization, as well as a separate residence for himself.84
As the Roaring Twenties came to a close, Jones weighed in on certain
resolutions that had been introduced in Congress that would have
authorized suits to recover the cotton tax proceeds—suits that would
have been permitted if brought not on behalf of ex-slaves, but by states
on behalf of the original taxpayers. If the original taxpayers could not
be located to return the funds, then the proceeds would escheat to the
states themselves.
On January 4, 1929, the House Ways and Means Committee
held a hearing on a resolution that would authorize the Supreme Court
to hear any state-filed suits. The Committee hearing record is replete
with discussion of the cotton tax, arguments over its constitutionality,
and other issues—but no discussion at all about the claims of the
formerly enslaved persons who had labored to produce the cotton.85
Jones filed what he described as a “brief” in support of the ex-slave
claimants, arguing that any cause of action properly belonged to the
ex-slaves and their heirs rather than the states. The brief stated that it
“will be outrageous to authorize the states to sue for money which they
had nothing in the world to do with as a State in face of persistent
claims being made” by the former slaves.86 Ultimately, the House took
no action on the resolution, and neither the states nor any ex-slaves
were ever authorized to sue for the return of the cotton tax proceeds.
Cornelius Jones died in Muskogee, Oklahoma on March 23,
1931. His landmark Supreme Court advocacy against racial injustice
and his championing of reparations were largely forgotten. There were
no laudatory obituaries or flowery memorials, and even one of the
leading Black newspapers of the day simply noted in its “Oklahoma
News” column that Jones was “a prominent figure among the citizens
of Muskogee and the state at large.”87 Even among the scholarly
writings that discuss his other Supreme Court battles, no mention is
made of Johnson v. McAdoo.88 And among reparations scholars,
Cornelius Jones receives scant attention.89
84

WASH. BEE, Oct. 16, 1920, at p.1.
Certain Taxes Collected in 1866, 1867, and 1868, Hearings Before the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 70th Cong. (1929).
86
Id.
87
CHI. DEFENDER, Mar. 28, 1931, at p.20.
88
See, e.g., RISER, supra note 38; LAWRENCE GOLDSTONE, ON ACCOUNT OF RACE: THE
SUPREME COURT, WHITE SUPREMACY, AND THE RAVAGING OF AFRICAN AMERICAN VOTING
RIGHTS, 175–90 (2020).
89
Kunnie, Supra note 37.
85

2022

“SEEKING THE FRUITS OF THEIR LABORS”

17

At rallies to gather support for the cotton tax lawsuit, Jones sold
copies of a song he had composed to help the cause. Entitled, “Voices
from the Tomb of the Slaves,” its first stanza sums up the mission
behind the Johnson v. McAdoo lawsuit:
Do you hear those voices calling
From their lone and musty graves
Urging us to note the toiling
Of the poor neglected slaves?90
Reparations, it has been noted, “are restitutional in nature, thus,
they are focused on removing from the defendant the spoils of his
unjust enrichment.”91 Jones’ equitable lien strategy in Johnson v.
McAdoo identified a specific source of funds directly tied to Black
enslaved labor and focused on it, rather than on the horrors of slavery
and the rhetoric of racial injustice—essentially opting to forego the
issue of defendant misconduct. Although litigation pursued nearly a
century later would opt for a different approach, they would prove no
more successful than Johnson v. McAdoo, which remains the only
reparations case to reach the U.S. Supreme Court. It, and its architects
Callie House and Cornelius J. Jones, deserve to be remembered by
those in today’s reparations movement.
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